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THE IMPACT OF TEACHER COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ON HIGH 
SCHOOL COACHES 
 
HARVEY M. SHRAGE* AND CURT HAMAKAWA** 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this article is to consider the impact of teacher collective 
bargaining agreements (CBA) on high school coaches.1  In considering the  
subject, the authors have reviewed labor arbitration decisions over a six-year 
period, 2009–2014, that involve secondary school coaches who are impacted 
by CBAs between teachers and school districts.  The authors compiled the  
arbitration decisions from the LexisNexis database of arbitration decisions and 
the Bloomberg (BNA) database of arbitration decisions.2  High school teachers 
                                                            
* Harvey M. Shrage, is Professor of Business Law at Western New England University, College 
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** Curt Hamakawa, is Associate Professor of Sport Management at Western New England  
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(CISB).  Mr. Hamakawa earned his J.D. degree from Western New England University, M.Ed. degree 
from Springfield College, and B.A. degree from the University of Hawaii.   
*** The authors would like to thank Christopher St. Martin and Claudia Quintero for their re-
search assistance. 
1. This article does not address cases involving school districts in which coaches are in their own 
bargaining unit.  See, e.g., Police Dep’t. v. State Bd. of Labor Relations, 622 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Conn. 
1993).  The court concluded that coaches who work at least 120 days per calendar year and at least 20 
hours per week may form their own union.  Id.  In addition, it should be noted that states may provide 
statutory protection for supplemental positions held by teachers.  Id.  Such statutes may provide  
protections in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement or provide protection beyond those 
provided for in a collective bargaining agreement applicable to supplemental positions, including 
coaching positions.  Id.; see 2012 AAA LEXIS 307 (2012) (Jaffe, Arb.) (The state of Ohio provides 
statutory protection over supplemental positions for its teachers, requiring that before a district offers 
a position to a “non-licensed” applicant, its school board must first adopt a resolution stating that it 
had offered the position to licensed employees, first within the district and then outside the district, 
and that no such employee qualified to fill the position.  Therefore, this statutory measure ensures that 
teachers in Ohio enjoy a first consideration in applying for and being offered coaching jobs regardless 
of whether their CBA provides them with such preferential treatment.). 
2. Not all arbitration decisions are made available to LEXIS and/or Bloomberg BNA (BNA) for 
publication.  The arbitration process is subject to the terms agreed upon by the parties and decisions 
may not be released to LEXIS, BNA or any other publication source.  Moreover, even if a decision is 
released to LEXIS and/or BNA the editors of the respective database have the discretion in determin-
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are a highly unionized group and a significant number of teachers are covered 
by CBAs.3  Since coaching positions are often an extra-curricular position for 
a teacher,4 teacher CBAs impact high school coaches.  Therefore, issues  
impacting high school coaches covered by a teacher CBA will be subject to 
the grievance arbitration procedure5 included in that agreement.6 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 11.1% of wage and salary 
workers were members of a union in 2015.7  In contrast, the union member-
ship rate in the public sector was 35.2% in 2015.8  Of the 4,535,249 teachers  
employed in elementary, secondary, and special education in 2014, 49% were 
unionized.9  Although this represents a decline from the 57.5% of the 1.5 mil-
lion teachers that were union members in 1983 (when the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics started tracking teacher union membership),10 it is still significantly 
                                                                                                                                               
ing which cases are published.  
3. Status of K-12 Public School Teacher Bargaining, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING & MEMBER ADVOC. fig.1, 
http://www.neacollectivebargaining.org/collbarg/Content/maps/Status%20of%20K-
12%20Public%20School%20Teacher%20Bargaining-Feb16.pdf (last visited May 15, 2017); see Ben-
jamin M. Superfine & Jessica J. Gottlieb, Teacher Evaluation and  
Collective Bargaining: The New Frontier for Civil Rights, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 737, 766–67 
(2014).  
4. GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 432 (4th ed. 2010) (often, high school coaches 
are “teachers first and coaches second.”).  In such cases, the teacher is serving as a coach as an  
extra-curricular activity and is subject to the provisions of the teacher collective bargaining agree-
ment.  Id.  
5. Grievance arbitration is the submission of the parties’ grievance to a private arbitrator or  
arbitrators who listen to the disputed question and give a binding decision regarding the dispute.  Id. 
at 432.  
6. Approximately 99% of collective bargaining agreements include a grievance/arbitration  
procedure.  Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The  
Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 317 (2007). 
7. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, UNION MEMBERS–2015 (Jan. 28, 2016). 
8. Id. 
9. Status of K-12 Public School Teacher Bargaining, supra note 3.  The significance of the 49% 
must be considered in light of the fact that only 34 states and the District of Columbia have bargain-
ing laws covering K-12 teachers.  Id.  Nine states have no bargaining law but limited bargaining takes 
place; in six states bargaining is prohibited; in one state “collaborative conferencing” is permitted.  Id.  
Further, it should be considered in the context of statistics gathered by the National Center for Educa-
tional Statistics revealing that in the thirty-four states that have bargaining laws for teachers, in twenty 
of the states in excess of 70% of the school districts have entered into collective bargaining agree-
ments.  Schools and Staffing Survey: Percentage Distribution of Public School Districts, by Specific  
Agreements with Teachers' Associations or Unions and State: 2007–08, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STAT. tbl.7, https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/tables/sass0708_2009320_d1s_07.asp (last visited May 
15, 2017).  
10. Status of K-12 Public School Teacher Bargaining, supra note 3.  The decrease in teacher un-
ion membership is due in part to the passage of state laws that have weakened the bargaining rights of 
teacher unions.  In Teacher Evaluation and Collective Bargaining: The New Frontier for Civil Rights 
the authors state: 
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higher than the percentage of private and public sector employees that are un-
ionized.11 
In this highly unionized environment, student participation in high school 
sports exceeded 7.8 million in 2014–2015,12 which was an all-time record.  In 
fact, National Federation of State High School Associations (NFHS) data  
indicates that 2014–2015 was the twenty-sixth consecutive year that high 
school sports participation has increased.13  This means that of the estimated 
15 million high school students,14 more than half participate in organized sport 
activities.  Given this trend, the implication for unionized school districts is 
that there will likely be a steady increase in the number of teacher-coaches 
covered by CBAs.15 
                                                                                                                                               
 
[A]t least twelve states modified their laws governing collective representation 
of public employees in 2012 alone.  In doing so, many of these states have 
weakened teachers’ unions’ abilities to bargain over issues such as teacher em-
ployment, grievance procedures, compensation, and working conditions. To-
gether, states’ enactment of teacher evaluation and accountability systems and 
modifications of laws governing collective bargaining form the centerpiece of 
reforms aimed at equalizing and increasing teachers’ effectiveness.   
 
Superfine & Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 741 (citations omitted).  In addition, public sector labor unions 
have been weakened by right to work laws.  In a right to work state, employers may not require  
employees to join a union or pay union dues as a condition of employment.  Id.  
11. Even in states allowing compulsory dues, public sector unions can only assess a “service fee” 
to cover the cost of collective bargaining.  Peter Kauffman, Note, Unionized Charter School Con-
tracts as a Model for Reform of Public School Job Security, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1379, 1382 n.10 
(2013).   
Recently, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the service fee.  See Friedrichs v. Cal. 
Teachers Ass’n, 136 S.Ct. 1083 (2016).  Due to a deadlocked 4-4 vote the lower court ruling uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the service fee stands.  Id.  Finally, the increase in the number of charter 
schools has contributed to the decline.  Kauffman, supra, at 1385.  A recent study indicates that most 
charter schools are not unionized.  Id.  
12. 2014–2015 High School Athletics Participation Survey, NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. 
ASS’NS, https://www.nfhs.org/ParticipationStatistics/PDF/2014-15_Participation_Survey_Results.pdf 
(last visited May 15, 2017); see Bryan Toporek, High School Sports Participation Eclipses 7.8 Mil-
lion for First Time, EDUC. WEEK’S BLOG (Aug. 19, 2015, 1:25 PM), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/schooled_in_sports/2015/08/high_school_sports_participation_eclips
es_78_million_for_first_time_ever.html. 
13. 2014–2015 High School Athletics Participation Survey, supra note 12. 
14. Public School Enrollment, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/pdf/coe_cga.pdf (last visited May 15, 2017); see 2011–2015 Ameri-
can Community Survey 5-Year Estimates: Selected Social Characteristics in the United States, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS 
_15_5YR_DP02&src=pt (last visited May 15, 2017) (census estimates the number enrolled in grade 9 
to grade 12 at 17,016,693). 
15. Coaches and Scouts: Occupational Outlook Handbook, U.S. DEP’T LAB. STAT. (Dec. 17, 
2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/entertainment-and-sports/coaches-and-scouts.htm#tab-2. 
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I. Overview of the Issues Raised by the Cases 
The authors reviewed forty-five arbitration decisions over a six-year peri-
od, twenty-seven of which involved the hiring of non-union members.  In  
descending order, the remaining cases were grievances relating to discipline 
(five), compensation (five), position elimination/transfer (three), arbitrability 
(three), and contract interpretation (two).16  While the authors acknowledge the 
limited sample size, it is nonetheless telling that most grievances brought by 
teacher-coaches allege wrongdoing on the part of the school district over its 
hiring of non-bargaining unit individuals over union members for positions as 
coaches of school teams.   
II. Hiring of Coaches 
Our review of arbitration cases indicates that decisions favoring bargain-
ing unit members often hinge on the language of the CBA that explicitly or  
implicitly grants preferential treatment to union members.  In 2011 BNA LA 
Supp 150387,17 a union member teacher who applied for his high school’s 
head football coaching job was passed over in favor of a non-teacher for the 
position.  In his grievance, the teacher alleged that in hiring the non-bargaining 
unit  
member as football coach, the school district violated the CBA, which, in  
addressing supplemental positions including coaching positions, stated that 
“[i]nterested bargaining unit members will be granted an interview for said  
position, and qualified applicants will be hired.”18  The arbitrator stated that 
where the CBA grants favored status to “qualified” bargaining unit members 
in hiring for coaching positions, it is generally management’s prerogative to  
determine the requisite qualifications for a given position.19  However, in this 
instance, the arbitrator ruled that the district abused its discretion in determin-
ing that the internal applicant was not qualified given his prior coaching expe-
rience, adding that the bargaining unit member need only be qualified, and not 
more qualified, than outside candidates.20 
Other agreements are less definitive in terms of the hiring imperative, but 
nonetheless grant union members favorable treatment in the hiring process in 
                                                            
16. Many cases raised more than a single and isolated issue, and categorization was based on the 
authors’ judgment and discretion. 
17. 2011 BNA LA Supp 150387 (2011) (Klein, Arb.).  
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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comparison to non-union members.  In 2009 AAA Lexis 504,21 the CBA grant-
ed bargaining unit members “first consideration” in applying for supplemental 
coaching positions, but without defining the term.  The arbitrator took this to 
mean that a bargaining unit member who applied for a supplemental position 
as a sport team coach had to be “thoughtfully regarded” before a hiring deci-
sion was made to fill the vacancy with a non-bargaining unit person.22  In the 
instant case, the arbitrator found “thoughtful regard” to have occurred by the 
grievant’s inclusion in the hiring process through the finalist stage.23  Con-
versely, some agreements are silent regarding preferential treatment for union 
members while others expressly state that supplemental positions can be as-
signed to non-union members if “no teacher who has the requisite skills and 
competencies has  
expressed an interest in the activity.”24  In 2012 AAA Lexis 377, the CBA  
expressly stated that coaching positions could be assigned to non-bargaining 
unit members if no otherwise qualified teacher had applied, which the school 
district took to mean that coaching positions were not the exclusive domain of 
the bargaining unit.25  Taking into consideration objective standards, including 
the fact that the applicant/grievant had previously coached baseball but not  
softball, the position for which he applied, the arbitrator concluded that it was 
not unreasonable for the district to conclude that the grievant was not quali-
fied, especially since the person who was hired for the position had previous 
softball coaching experience.26 
Even in cases in which a school district has discretion to hire one person 
over another, the decision should have a rational basis and not be made in “bad 
faith” or in an “arbitrary or capricious” manner.27  In 2012 BNA LA Supp. 
149133,28 the union alleged that three teachers who were bargaining unit  
                                                            
21. 2009 AAA Lexis 504 (2009) (Murphy, Arb.).  
22. Id. at 11. 
23. Id. 
 24. 2012 AAA Lexis 377, 12 (2012) (Chiesa, Arb.). 
25. Id. at 8, 12. 
26. Id. at 16–17. 
27. In re City of Mansfield v. Fraternal Order of Police, 135 BNA LA 1081 (2015) (Szuter, Arb.) 
(“[A]gency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency contravenes the legislature's intent, fails to 
consider a crucial aspect of the problem, or offers an explanation which is so implausible that it runs 
contrary to agency expertise.” (citations omitted)).  Further, “arbitrary and capricious” has been de-
fined as “‘a decision or action . . . without consideration or in disregard of facts or law or without de-
termining principle.’”  2005 AAA LEXIS 853, 12 (2005) (Lewandowski, Arb.) (quoting Arbitrary 
and  
Capricious, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).  See U__ Teachers Ass’n v. Emp’r 2013 
BNA LA Supp. 149945 (2013) (Germano, Arb.); Teachers Union v. Emp’r, 2012 BNA LA Supp 
149133 (2012) (Dunn, Arb.); 2011 BNA LA Supp. 150387 (2011) (Klein, Arb.).  
28. Teachers Union, 2012 BNA LA Supp. 149133.  
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members were encouraged by the school’s athletics director to apply for the 
head girls’ basketball coaching position.29  Subsequently, however, the athlet-
ics director seemed less encouraging, leaving the teachers with the impression 
that the athletics director became aware of an outside candidate with sterling  
credentials.30  While the union characterized this change in tone as an indica-
tion that “the fix was in” and tantamount to bad faith on the part of the district, 
the arbitrator disagreed, saying the “[e]mployer enjoys significant discretion to  
select the person who it assesses to be ‘most qualified.’”31  In 2013 BNA LA 
Supp. 149945,32 the arbitrator considered language in the CBA that stated that 
the district “shall not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner” in its hiring of 
coaches.33  The arbitrator held that the district’s decision to hire outside the 
unit was not arbitrary and capricious because it considered all candidates on an 
equal basis in exercising its right to hire the most qualified person as coach.34   
Specifically, the arbitrator noted that the interview committee was properly  
constituted, the questions were fairly and reasonably constructed and asked of 
each candidate, the scoring system was applied equally to each candidate, and 
the successful candidate’s score was significantly higher than that of the 
grievant.35  In 2012 AAA Lexis 582,36 the union alleged bad faith on the part of 
the district because the districted hired a non-bargaining unit member as coach 
of the girls’ basketball team over three bargaining unit members.37  Since the 
CBA did not grant a hiring preference to bargaining unit members, however, 
and the non-bargaining unit member received the highest ratings from the hir-
ing committee, the arbitrator found that the district did not act in bad faith in 
hiring outside the union.38   
In 2014 AAA Lexis 318,39 the CBA contained a provision for the employer 
to identify suitable candidates for a vacant position in concert with the union 
under a “joint best efforts” clause.40  In this case, two teachers, both union  
members, in addition to one applicant (non-bargaining unit member) from  
                                                            
29. See id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. 2013 BNA LA Supp. 149945. 
33. Id. 
34. Id.  
35. Id.  
36. 2012 AAA Lexis 582 (2012) (Dunn, Arb.).  
37. See id. at 34–35. 
38. Id. at 37–38. 
39. 2014 AAA Lexis 318 (2014) (Martin, Arb.).  
40. Id. at 3. 
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outside the district, applied for a soccer coaching position.41  For reasons that 
the principal found to be disqualifying, the two teachers were passed over in 
favor of the outside applicant, who was given the job.42  In doing so, however, 
the principal neglected to respect the contract provision that stated “if no  
appropriate volunteers apply, the Principal and Association President shall 
make their ‘joint best efforts’ to find other appropriate volunteers from among 
members of the bargaining unit,” and the union filed a grievance on this ba-
sis.43  Because there was no consultation between the principal and the union 
president in an attempt to solicit interest from appropriate union members, the 
grievance was upheld.44   
III. Compensation 
Five of the forty-five arbitration decisions that the authors reviewed  
addressed compensation as the primary issue.45  Since teachers sometimes  
volunteer as coaches, particularly as assistant coaches, the issue of longevity 
pay might be raised when a previously volunteer position becomes a paid  
position.  In 2014 AAA LEXIS 71,46 two teachers who each contributed various 
years of service as assistant football coaches, both in paid and unpaid capaci-
ties, requested that the district count their voluntary, unpaid years for purposes 
of longevity pay.47  Pursuant to these union members’ CBA, extracurricular 
coaches  
 
with at least five (5) complete and continuous years of service 
in a particular extracurricular sport or activity shall receive  
longevity pay equal to five percent (5%) of the base pay for 
that particular sport or activity for each consecutive five (5)  
complete and continuous school year periods of service in that 
particular sport or activity.48 
 
In upholding the district’s denial of credit towards extracurricular longevi-
ty pay for the grievant teachers, the arbitrator noted that since the teachers 
                                                            
41. Id. at 4. 
42. Id. at 4–5. 
43. Id. at 3, 5–6. 
44. Id. at 10, 12. 
45. Supplemental pay for coaching jobs not only boost one’s current income, but over twenty, 
thirty, or forty years and can significantly impact other benefits.  
46. 2014 AAA LEXIS 71 (2014) (Kaufman, Arb.).  
47. See id. at 8–9. 
48. Id. at 4. 
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were not paid in the years that they volunteered, there was no basis to use as a  
multiplier those unpaid years.49  The arbitrator determined that because the 
CBA was silent with regard to compensation for volunteer coaches, it was not  
unreasonable to conclude that the parties did not contemplate crediting  
volunteer service for purposes of longevity pay.50  In a retroactive pay case, In 
re Cardinal Local Schools v. Cardinal Education Ass’n,51 a teacher who  
previously served as an unpaid, volunteer scout sought back pay based upon 
the creation of a new scout position as a paid job.52  Even though the position 
was made retroactive to the beginning of the then-current school year, the 
teacher’s request was denied because there was no guarantee that just because 
he held the position as a volunteer he would have been appointed to the job 
when it became a paid position.53  In addition, the mere creation or existence 
of an authorized position does not obligate the district to fill it, and the teacher 
should not have assumed that (a) it would have been filled in the current year 
and (b) he would have been appointed to the position.54  
Sometimes contract language of the CBA itself gives rise to grievances  
because of undefined or ill-defined terminology, the meaning of which is not 
clear on its face even when taking into account the ordinary meaning of the 
words.  In 2011 AAA LEXIS 472,55 two high school football teams qualified 
for post-season play; one team was eliminated after losing its second playoff 
game while the other was eliminated after losing its third playoff game.56  The 
coaches of the team that was eliminated after its third postseason game re-
ceived one additional week’s pay, while the coaches of the other team did not 
receive any extra pay, about which they grieved.  While the CBA included a 
provision  
stating that “[p]ay for extended season is to be pro-rated,” it did not define  
“extended season.”57  Thus, the arbitrator was obliged to look to past practice 
within the district.  While each high school football team in the district  
ordinarily played eleven regular season games, playoff eligibility was  
determined by the team’s record after the tenth regular season game.58  Teams 
making the playoffs then commenced play in the eleventh week while  
                                                            
49. Id. at 21–22. 
50. Id. 
51. In re Cardinal Local Sch. v. Cardinal Educ. Ass’n, 127 BNA LA 882 (2010) (Lalka, Arb.). 
52. See id. at 883. 
53. Id. at 884. 
54. Id. at 885. 
55. 2011 AAA LEXIS 472 (2011) (Brown, Arb.).  
56. Id. at 3. 
57. See id. at 3, 12. 
58. Id. at 4. 
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non-playoff teams finished out the season against their regularly scheduled  
opponent in week eleven.59  The high school team that advanced to a third 
playoff game played that game on the day after Thanksgiving, and based on 
the school district’s policy that considered the football season to end on  
Thanksgiving Day, only the coaches of the team that played after Thanksgiv-
ing received pro-rated pay for one week.60  Here, the union argued that ex-
tended season was tantamount to post-season play (meaning any games be-
yond the  
regularly scheduled competition season for that sport), but the district denied 
the requests based on its position that the football season ended on Thanksgiv-
ing Day; thus, only games subsequently played were deemed to be in the ex-
tended season.61  In addition, the district insisted that past practice dictated that 
the football season ended on Thanksgiving Day.62  The arbitrator found that 
the union did not meet its burden of proving that the district violated the CBA 
or past practice by its refusal to pay extended season pay to the grievants.63  In 
this case, the arbitrator was persuaded that the football regular season, in ac-
cordance with tradition and practice, ended on Thanksgiving Day.64 
IV. Discipline 
A review of discipline cases involving coaches highlights the importance 
of documentation in the handling and disposition of ensuing grievances.  In 
large part, this is because unlike most hiring situations where the district has 
latitude to exercise discretion in its management decisions, disciplinary actions  
generally require a showing of “just cause.”  Just cause is the term used in a 
significant number of CBAs to evaluate whether disciplinary action taken by 
an employer was justified.65  Over the years, arbitrators have developed a 
number of definitions for determining just cause.  A well-known and widely 
referenced standard developed by arbitrator Carroll Daugherty includes seven 
factors that an arbitrator must consider to determine if there is just cause for 
the disciplinary action.66  The following seven questions are considered under 
                                                            
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 4–5. 
61. Id. at 12, 15. 
62. Id. at 15. 
63. Id. at 16. 
64. Id. at 20. 
65. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 930–31 (Alan Miles Ruben 
ed., 6th ed. 2003); see Wendi J. Delmendo, Determining Just Cause: An Equitable Solution for the 
Workplace, 66 WASH. L. REV. 831, 832 (1991).   
66. In re Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
555, 558 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.); In re Enterprise Wire Co. v. Enterprise Indep. Union, 46 Lab. 
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the Daugherty standard in order to determine whether just cause exists for the 
discipline or termination:  
 
(1) Did the [employer provide] to the employee  
forewarning or foreknowledge of the possible or probabl[e]  
disciplinary consequences of the employee’s conduct? 
. . .  
(2) Was the [employer]’s rule or managerial order  
reasonably related to (a) the orderly, efficient, and safe  
operation of the [employer]’s business and (b) the perfor-
mance that the company might properly expect of the employ-
ee? 
. . .  
(3) Did the [employer], before administering discipline to 
the employee, make an effort to discover whether the employ-
ee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order of [the em-
ployer]? 
. . .  
(4) Was the [employer]’s investigation conducted fairly 
and objectively? 
. . .  
(5) At the investigation[,] did the “judge” obtain substan-
tial evidence or proof that the employee was guilty as 
charged? 
. . .  
(6) Has the [employer] applied its rules, orders, and  
penalties evenhandedly and without discrimination to all  
employees?  
. . . 
(7) Was the degree of discipline administered by the  
[employer] in a particular case reasonably related to (a) the  
seriousness of the employee’s proven offense and (b) the rec-
ord of the employee in his service with the [employer]?67 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359, 362–65 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.). 
67. In re Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 363–64.  See In re Grief Bros. Cooperage 
Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 558; see also Harvey Shrage, The “Just Cause” Standard: Is an Investi-
gation Needed?, 3 ROCKY MTN. L.J. 17, 20 (2015).  
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As arbitrator Daugherty stated, “A ‘no’ answer to any one or more of the . 
. . questions normally signifies that just and proper cause did not exist.”68   
Arbitrator Daugherty’s test has been criticized as being too focused on the  
investigatory factor and thus has been regarded as a guideline rather than a 
strict formula.69 
In 2010 AAA LEXIS 25,70 a hockey coach was removed from his position 
for using profanity, making racial stereotypes, and playing a student-athlete 
who was under a doctor’s instruction not to play.  In the grievance arbitration, 
the district was held to the just cause standard, as contained in the CBA, to 
wit:  “No teacher or teaching assistant will be disciplined, reduced in rank, or 
deprived of professional advantage without just cause.”71  In support of its de-
cision to  
remove the coach from his position, the district was able to demonstrate by 
tape recordings that the coach used “inappropriate, demeaning and derogatory  
language toward the student-athletes” and made “inappropriate racial  
stereotypes.”72  In addition, the district established that the coach used a player 
who was not medically cleared to play in two games, a decision that the  
arbitrator found to be careless at best.73  Further, the district was able to show 
that on at least two prior occasions, it had put the coach on notice about  
inappropriate and unprofessional behavior, and that he had been warned that 
further instances of misconduct would have more serious consequences.74 
In another arbitration case, a longtime teacher, coach, and athletics direc-
tor was given a two-day suspension for referring to his principal as a “bitch.”75  
The derogatory reference was made as the athletics director was leaving the  
principal’s office and in the presence of the principal’s administrative assistant 
and a student’s parent, who was in the waiting area outside the principal’s  
office.76  When the administrative assistant informed the principal what the  
athletics director said, the principal asked both the administrative assistant and 
the parent to make written statements of what they had just witnessed, in 
which they corroborated the name calling with the athletics director using the 
                                                            
68. In re Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 558.  
69. Howell L. Lankford et al., Did He Do It?: Employer Handbook ‘Just Cause’ Meets the Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement, 17 LERC MONOGRAPH SERV. 17, 22 (2003); see Shrage, supra note 67, at 
20. 
70. 2010 AAA LEXIS 25 (2010) (Donn, Arb.). 
71. Id. at 3. 
72. Id. at 41. 
73. Id.  
74. Id. 
75. 2009 AAA LEXIS 1031, 2–3 (2009) (Daniel, Arb.). 
76. Id. at 1–2. 
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word “bitch” in reference to the principal.77  In the letter notifying the athletics  
director of his two-day suspension for his misconduct, the athletics director 
was cited for his “continued use of inappropriate language and disrespectful  
conduct.”78  The letter further reminded the athletics director that use of  
“derogatory, offensive and demeaning language was unprofessional and would 
not be tolerated under any circumstances and that he, along with all other staff, 
was expected to act as a role model for students.”79  
While the more extreme examples of employee discipline involve  
discharge, demotion, or some form of suspension, even circumstances that 
give rise to warnings require the employer to prove just cause.80  Even disci-
pline issued to an employee short of termination is important for districts to 
prove because lower-level discipline often serve as evidence of progressive  
discipline81 justifying higher-level discipline to be issued to the employee up-
on proof of future misconduct.  In another discipline case, where a bargaining 
unit member called in sick for his regular job as a campus security aide but 
then showed up later that day to coach the school’s baseball team, resulting in 
his reprimand for abuse of sick leave, he was able to demonstrate that he had a 
legitimate excuse.82  In this situation, the coach had been up all night because 
he took his son to the hospital’s emergency room around midnight and was not 
discharged until approximately 7 a.m., after which he called in sick to care for 
his son, which he was entitled to do under the CBA.83  Subsequently, the 
coach provided his supervisor with the emergency room slips with date and 
                                                            
77. Id. at 2. 
78. Id. at 3. 
79. Id. at 3–4. 
80. 2007 AAA LEXIS 820, 10 (2007) (Cain, Arb.) (Arbitrator Cain stated, “Pursuant to the  
[c]ontract, the Company has the right to impose and issue discipline for just cause, including letters of 
warning.”).   
81. See 2008 AAA LEXIS 558, 42 (2008) (Henderson-Ellis, Arb.) Arbitrator Henderson-Ellis  
provided an excellent description of progressive discipline, “[p]rogressive discipline—a system of  
addressing employee behavior through escalating penalties—is a central principle of industrial due  
process and just cause.”  Id. at 58.  She goes on to state: 
 
A basic tenet of just cause is providing employees with a fair opportunity 
to correct misconduct and to undergo rehabilitation. It is only when it can be 
fairly determined that an employee is incorrigible, or when a matter is so serious 
that an employer should not have to keep someone in his/her employ even an-
other day, can discharge be imposed summarily.  
 
Id. at 59. 
82. In re Rio Rancho Pub. Sch. v. Rio Rancho Emps. Union, 132 BNA LA 977, 979 (2013) (Keyl, 
Arb.). 
83. See id. 
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time stamps.84  About two weeks later, the coach was given a written repri-
mand for abusing his sick leave, based on him calling in sick for his security 
duties but then returning later that day to coach the baseball team.85  The 
coach’s grievance seeking removal of the written reprimand was sustained 
since he followed the reporting protocol in notifying his immediate supervisor 
that he would not be in that day and would be taking a sick day.86  In addition, 
the arbitration award required the district to apologize in writing to the coach 
for alleging misconduct regarding misuse of sick leave, since the coach com-
plied with the CBA and district policy in calling in sick.87  
V. Position Elimination/Transfer 
While it is understood that a school district’s economic circumstances 
might dictate a reduction in staffing that leads to the elimination of teaching 
positions, this same effect is sometimes the product of school mergers due to 
declining enrollments.  When schools merge, there are inherent redundancies 
that can be eliminated because there would be no need for duplication of func-
tions; for  
example, two principals, two athletics directors, two band directors, two head 
football coaches, etc.  Thus, in situations of school mergers, it is not uncom-
mon for teachers and staff to become displaced in the process.  In 2013 BNA 
LA Supp. 148123,88 the arbitrator addressed the merger of two high schools’ 
football  
programs, where one district ceded control of the football coaching appoint-
ment process to the other district, which resulted in the bargaining unit mem-
ber—who was the high school football coach at one of the schools—losing his  
coaching job.89  Even though the supplanted coach was offered a position as 
coach of the combined districts’ freshman football team, he declined the offer 
and grieved his displacement on the basis that the district did not utilize the 
CBA provisions governing “the appointment and compensation of the football 
coach.”90  Here, the merger decision was driven by fiscal constraints and made 
in reasonable exercise of the district’s managerial rights,91 and following the 
merger, it was not possible for the district to heed the CBA procedures for the 
                                                            
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 982. 
87. Id. at 984. 
88. 2013 BNA LA Supp. 148123 (2013) (Rinaldo, Arb.).  
89. See id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
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appointment of a football coach.92  The arbitrator concluded that the job offer 
to the displaced coach as freshman coach of the merged high schools’ football  
programs was made in good faith, and the football coach’s decision not to ac-
cept it did not give rise to an actionable grievance.93  The arbitrator noted that 
while the grievant sought strict performance under the CBA, once the two dis-
tricts merged, thereby eliminating one high school football program entirely, it  
became impossible for the district that lost its football program to adhere to the 
hiring provisions under the CBA.94  Another case, 2009 AAA LEXIS 863,95  
involved an apparent cost-savings measure, whereby a district combined the  
position of middle school principal with that of director of physical education 
upon learning that the physical education position was required by state  
regulation.96  Inasmuch as there was no state regulation requiring districts to 
have an athletics director, the district opted not to fill that position, which was 
a listed position in the CBA.97  The arbitrator concluded that since the CBA 
neither required nor guaranteed that all of the supplemental coaching posi-
tions, including the athletics director position, be filled, it was left to the dis-
trict’s  
discretion whether to fill any of the positions.98  In denying the union’s  
grievance, however, the arbitrator made clear that his decision did not give the 
district carte blanche to abolish bargaining unit work and reassign positions 
outside the unit.99  
Another related situation is the involuntary transfer of bargaining unit  
members from one school to another.  The issue that arises is whether, under 
management’s function to allocate resources—including personnel—across 
the educational landscape, it is reasonable for districts to transfer teachers 
from one school to another in order to best address their curricular needs.  In 
In re  
Northwest Local School District Board of Education v. Northwest Ass’n of  
Educators,100 as part of a district-wide reduction-in-force action, two teachers 
were involuntarily transferred from one high school to another high school and 
                                                            
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. 2009 AAA LEXIS 863 (2009) (Trela, Arb.). 
96. See id. at 3–5. 
97. Id. at 4. 
98. Id. at 17–18. 
99. Id. at 20. 
100. In re Nw. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Nw. Ass’n of Educators, 128 BNA LA 1690 
(2011) (Heekin, Arb.). 
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middle school, respectively.101  Both teachers were told that the reason for 
their transfer was that the district wanted to retain teachers at the incumbent 
high school who were department heads or varsity head coaches, and since 
they were neither, they were designated to be transferred out, notwithstanding 
their  
longevity seniority over other teachers.102  The teachers’ grievance hinged on 
the CBA language that granted the superintendent “sole discretion” to assign 
and transfer members in the district for “valid educational reasons.”103  In 
large part because of the clarity of the CBA’s language granting sole authority 
to the superintendent in this matter, and the inability of the union to undermine 
the  
validity of the district’s educational objectives, the grievance was denied.104  
The arbitrator noted that the lack of any reference to teacher seniority vis-à-vis 
involuntary transfers in the CBA underscored the primacy of the  
superintendent’s unfettered power and authority to determine such matters.105  
The arbitrator denied the grievance based on language in the CBA conferring 
teacher transfer authority on the superintendent, the lack of any provision in 
consideration of teacher seniority, and the union’s failure to make a persuasive 
case that the transfer was not for valid educational reasons.106  
VI. Contract Interpretation 
Careful drafting of a CBA is critical to eliminating or at least reducing  
grievances during the life of a CBA.107  In 2011 BNA La Supp. 149464,108 the 
arbitrator noted with regard to contract interpretation, “[t]he starting point is to 
review the actual language adopted by the parties to express their intent and to 
determine what that language meant to them when the Agreement was drafted 
and mutually-adopted.”109  The arbitrator went on to state, “Arbitrators cannot 
search for inferences and intentions that are not apparent and not actually  
                                                            
101. See id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1691. 
104. Id. at 1692. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. See, e.g., 2011 AAA LEXIS 472 (2011) (Brown, Arb.) (where the issue was whether a coach 
was entitled to extra pay for post-season play where the CBA did not define “extended season.”  Id. at 
2.). 
108. Emp’r v. Sch. Emps., AFSCME Local _, Local #_, 2011 BNA LA Supp. 149464 (2011) 
(Stein, Arb.). 
109. See id. 
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supported by any contractual language documenting any purported intent.”110  
However, at times, past practice may be relied upon.111  The arbitrator noted: 
 
No matter how clear the language of the [CBA] seems to 
be, it does not always tell the full story of the parties’ inten-
tions . . . Conduct of the parties may be evidence of a subse-
quent modification of their contract . . . C[BAs] include not 
only the written provisions stated therein but also the under-
standing and mutually accepted practices which have devel-
oped over the years.112 
 
In 2008 AAA LEXIS 911,113 the arbitrator provided a well-established  
definition of a past practice:  
 
Past practice as a tool for contract interpretation is used 
most widely where the contract is (1) ambiguous as to the  
practice being scrutinized and (2) the evidence shows a  
consistent and mutually accepted pattern of administering the 
agreement under similar circumstances.  Ambiguity exists 
where the meaning of the contract language is unclear.  The 
practice, if it meets the requirements of consistency and  
mutuality, supplies substance to language that lacks  
specificity.114 
	  
In the above case, the arbitrator considered a situation where two separate 
groups of student-athletes participated in voluntary, off-campus, sport-related 
activities over the summer, and where the union asserted that such activities 
constituted “field trips” under the terms of the CBA and consequently required 
the district to provide district-owned transportation and use bargaining unit  
drivers.115  Under this provision, field trips were defined as “a curricular or  
extra-curricular event involving the transportation of nine (9) passengers not 
                                                            
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. (citations omitted). 
113. 2008 AAA LEXIS 911 (2008) (Kahn, Arb.). 
114. Id. at 6.  In his decision, Arbitrator Kahn considered the role of past practice in a case involv-
ing an 8th grade math teacher and coach for the 7th grade volleyball team that claimed that he was 
being improperly compensated for his volleyball coaching assignment. 
115. Sch. Emps., AFSCME Local _, Local #_, 2011 BNA LA Supp. 149464. 
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including driver.”116  While it was stipulated that there were more than nine 
student-athlete participants in each of the above-mentioned activities, the fo-
cus here was whether the summer activities constituted “curricular or  
extra-curricular events” within the meaning of the CBA.117  The union argued 
that the football coach was present, that the coach directed his players at the 
scrimmage, and that the players used district-provided helmets and other  
equipment at the event.  The district countered that neither event was listed in 
the district’s events calendar and that neither had been planned nor executed 
with the district’s knowledge or approval.118  Further, the events were  
out-of-season and out-of-school programs that were voluntary, and as such did 
not involve members of the entire football and soccer teams.119  In this case, 
the arbitrator concluded that the facts indicated: 
 
[A] meeting of the minds between the parties that reflects that 
both of them, by their actions and inactions, have chosen to 
consistently recognize that “Field Trips,” as defined in Article 
XVIII, does not include trips, such as the football and soccer 
events leading to the instant grievances, which have been 
viewed as extracurricular activities requiring District-provided 
transportation.  It is apparent that the parties have reached a 
mutual agreement regarding that practice.  The Union has had 
ample opportunity to reject and/or grieve the existing practice 
or negotiate specific and more favorable terms into the current 
Agreement.120 
 
However, even where a clear past practice exists, the practice can have  
limited or no impact due to rights conferred in the CBA.  In 2008 AAA LEXIS 
911,121 the arbitrator, citing Elkouri and Elkouri, stated:  
 
While custom and past practice are used very frequently 
to establish the intent of contract provisions which are so  
ambiguous or so general as to be capable of different  
interpretations, they ordinarily will not be used to give mean-
ing to a provision which is clear and unambiguous. 
                                                            
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. 2008 AAA LEXIS 911 (2008) (Kahn, Arb.). 
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Elkouri continues, citing arbitration decisions[, ]“Prior 
acts cannot be used to change the explicit terms of a contract . 
. . [N]o matter how well established a practice may be, it is  
unavailing to modify a clear promise.”122  
 
In 2011 BNA LA Supp. 149704,123 a clear and unequivocal thirty-year past 
practice existed that “[t]he Athletic Director will forward the name of the  
incumbent unit member to the Superintendent for recommendation to that 
coaching position,” and “[t]he superintendent will recommend the incumbent 
coach to the Board of Education for their decision regarding reappoint-
ment.”124  In this case, however, the recommendation was not made and the 
incumbent coach was not appointed to the position.125  Although the arbitrator 
concluded that the district’s longstanding past practice was “clear and une-
quivocal,” and thus the teacher’s non-recommendation violated the CBA, he 
drew the line there, adding that the district did not violate the CBA by not re-
appointing the teacher as soccer coach because “matters of hiring and ap-
pointment are  
non-delegable rights and responsibilities reserved to the [district].”126  While 
past practice is commonly used by arbitrators as an aid to interpret ambiguous 
terms in a CBA, here the arbitrator determined that the district’s authority to 
hire and appoint members was not susceptible to interpretation, and that the  
responsibility was “reserved to the Board of Education.”127 
The impact of past practice can also be eliminated through bargaining.  In 
2010 BNA LA Supp. 162490,128 a school district was held not to have abused 
its discretion in filling a coaching vacancy from outside the district,  
notwithstanding a provision in an earlier CBA granting “first consideration” to 
qualified bargaining unit teachers.129  The arbitrator noted that the applicable 
CBA removed the preference for bargaining unit members, and therefore it 
was reasonable to conclude that the parties did not intend to grant favored sta-
tus for union members.130 
 
                                                            
122. Id. at 7. 
123. Teachers Ass’n v. Emp’r, 2011 BNA LA Supp. 149704 (2011) (LaLonde, Arb.). 
124. See id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. 2010 BNA LA Supp. 162490 (2010) (Caffera, Arb.). 
129. See id. 
130. Id. 
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VII. Arbitrability 
 
The jurisdiction of an arbitrator to decide the merits of a case can be lim-
ited by the terms of the CBA entered into between a union and an employer.   
Arbitrability refers to the “jurisdiction or authority” of an arbitrator to decide 
the merits of a case.131  Substantive arbitrability describes whether the subject 
of the grievance has been specifically excluded from being arbitrated.132  In 
2007 AAA LEXIS 516,133 the arbitrator stated, “Substantive arbitrability raises 
the question of whether the parties agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration.  
Arbitration is a consensual process, and no party may be compelled to engage 
in grievance arbitration over an issue that it has not agreed would be subject to 
determination by an arbitrator.”134 
Procedural arbitrability describes whether the procedures provided for in 
the CBA have been followed.135  In the instant case, the arbitrator provided  
insight into the question of procedural arbitrability in his consideration of 
whether a grievance was filed within the time limits set forth in the CBA.136  
The contract required that a grievance be filed “within thirty (30) days after 
the grievant had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the asserted vio-
lation of the Agreement giving rise to the grievance.”137  Therefore, the arbi-
trator noted that “[t]he question of procedural arbitrability turns on the point 
from which the 30 days is measured, and that depends upon when the Grievant 
may be said to have ‘had knowledge’ of the violation.”138 
In 2009 AAA LEXIS 1227,139 a case where a long-serving athletics director 
was not reappointed to his position and grieved his dismissal, the arbitrator 
wrestled with the question of whether the dispute was arbitrable.140  Although 
the union was able to show that the district had, two years earlier, agreed to 
settle a grievance concerning the compensation of the athletics director, the 
CBA contained several references indicating the parties’ intent to exclude the 
athletics director position from the bargaining unit.141  First, the CBA’s  
                                                            
131. HARVEY A. NATHAN & SARA MCLAURIN GREEN, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 
§ 8.01(2) (LexisNexis Grp. 2016). 
132. Id. § 8.01(3). 
133. 2007 AAA LEXIS 516 (2007) (Nielsen, Arb.). 
134. Id. at 30. 
135. NATHAN & GREEN, supra note 131, § 8.01(2). 
136. 2007 AAA LEXIS 516 at 33–37. 
137. See id. at 33. 
138. Id. 
139. 2009 AAA LEXIS 1227 (2009) (Wolkinson, Arb.).  
140. See id. at 1. 
141. Id. at 8–9. 
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recognition clause specifically lists “teachers, school librarians, social work-
ers, the school psychologist, instructional support recruiter, mentor, and teach-
er consultant,” but it did not include the athletics director.142  In addition, the  
athletics director’s job description stated that the position “is part of the  
management team” and, as such, was not covered by the CBA.143  Further, the 
athletics director position was listed in a section of the CBA that provided “all 
employees appointed under this Schedule serve ‘at the pleasure of the 
board.’”144  In addressing the district’s previous settlement of a grievance with 
the athletics director, the arbitrator noted, “[O]ne instance does not establish a 
past practice” and concluded that the athletics director position was not in-
cluded in the bargaining unit, and therefore, the grievance was not arbitra-
ble.145 
 In 2009 AAA LEXIS 1120,146 a school basketball coach was rejected for  
reappointment by the Board of Education in favor of a non-bargaining unit 
member, despite favorable recommendations from the district’s athletics  
director and superintendent.147  Even though the coach was a bargaining unit 
member covered by the CBA, the CBA itself contained language that effec-
tively removed hiring and appointment decisions from the arbitration pro-
cess.148  In this instance, the CBA granted broad administrative rights to the 
district stating that “the direction of the working forces are solely and exclu-
sively the function and prerogative of the Board of Education and its admin-
istration and the  
exercise thereof . . . are reserved and retained exclusively by and to the Board 
of Education and are not subject to arbitration.”149  Based upon the broad  
discretion given to the Board, the arbitrator concluded that the grievance was 
not arbitrable.150 
Other grievances are not arbitrable due to procedural flaws.  For example, 
in 2013 AAA LEXIS 292,151 a teacher who served variously as his school’s  
athletics director and coach of several teams including a position as head  
football coach for twenty-six years, resigned to coach in another district.152   
                                                            
142. Id. at 9.  
143. See id. 
144. Id. at 11. 
145. Id. at 15–16. 
146. 2009 AAA Lexis 1120 (2009) (Kaufman, Arb.).  
147. See id. at 6. 
148. Id. at 27–28. 
149. Id. at 3. 
150. Id. at 28. 
151. 2013 AAA LEXIS 292 (2013) (Zeiser, Arb.).  
152. See id. at 9. 
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Subsequently, when the school’s current football coach asked him to help out 
with the program as coach of the junior varsity program, he agreed.153  How-
ever, the Board of Education voted against appointing him to the position even 
though the superintendent recommended him, and the coach thereafter grieved 
the Board’s decision.154  Notwithstanding the merits of the grievance, howev-
er, the coach failed to timely file his grievance in accordance with the CBA.155  
Here, the coach had five days from the date of the adverse decision on his 
grievance to request that his union submit the matter to arbitration, after which 
the union had another five days to notify the Board of its demand for arbitra-
tion.156   
Unfortunately for the grievant, he did not serve notice to the Board of his  
demand for arbitration until 13 working days after receipt of the Board’s  
decision, and in determining that he did not comply with the CBA’s ten-day 
contractual limit, the grievance was dismissed as not being arbitrable.157  
CONCLUSION 
Although grievances over the hiring (or non-hiring) of unionized teachers 
for coaching positions within a school district constituted the majority of  
arbitration cases reviewed in this study by the authors, teacher/coaches also 
grieved issues concerning discipline, compensation, position  
elimination/transfer, arbitrability, and contract interpretation.   
I. Hiring 
Since teacher CBAs often contemplate the opportunity for teachers in the 
bargaining unit to seek appointment as school coaches via supplemental  
contracts, the parameters for such hiring are set forth in the contract.158  Our 
research indicates that such contracts often grant some degree of preference to 
bargaining unit members, sometimes compelling their appointment over out-
side applicants of equal or better qualification.159  Certainly, the inclusion or  
exclusion of language giving preferential treatment in hiring to bargaining unit 
members impacts the district’s flexibility in the hiring of coaches.160 
                                                            
153. Id. at 10. 
154. Id. at 11–13. 
155. Id. at 19–20. 
156. Id. at 20. 
157. Id. at 25–26. 
158. See 2011 BNA LA Supp. 150387 (2011) (Klein, Arb.). 
159. See 2014 AAA LEXIS 318 (2014) (Martin, Arb.). 
160. See id. 
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Although a school district does lose flexibility where employing a full-
time teacher as a part-time coach, it must be recognized that in hiring a part-
time coach in the same way that it hires teachers to perform other extra-
curricular duties, it is making a statement regarding the role of a coach in its 
athletic  
programs.  In light of the rather modest stipends paid to teacher/coaches,161 
school districts may well be recognizing that in order to attract teachers to take 
on the duties of a part-time coach, it must be willing to bargain away the  
flexibility of hiring from outside the bargaining unit.  This may well be an 
acknowledgement that if a school district moves to a full-time coaching staff, 
it may lead to a separate bargaining unit162 for coaches and to the need to pay 
significantly more in salary.  
II. Compensation 
The arbitration cases in this study that raised compensation issues did so in 
the context of whether volunteer service as a coach counted for purposes of  
longevity pay,163 retroactive pay,164 and for compensation calculations for 
coaching duties during an extended season.165  An issue that did not arise in 
any of the cases reviewed was whether the extra-curricular pay of a coach was  
considered for retirement benefits calculation.  Although the extra pay may  
often be nominal, over the course of years of coaching it would likely have an 
impact on the retirement benefits of a teacher-coach.  It is an issue worthy of 
consideration during the negotiation process.  
III. Discipline 
The just cause standard is incorporated in almost all CBAs.166  In evaluat-
ing the facts of a case under the just cause standard, arbitrators consider, 
among other things, evidence demonstrating that the employee committed the 
offense, evidence of the employer’s rules upon which the employee was issued  
discipline, the employee’s employment record, and whether discipline was  
issued in a consistent manner.167  The common thread across discipline cases 
                                                            
161. Dana Severson, How Much Do High School Basketball Coaches Get Paid?, HOUSTON 
CHRON., http://work.chron.com/much-high-school-basketball-coaches-paid-13525.html (last visited 
May 15, 2017). 
162. See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. State Bd. of Labor Relations, 622 A.2d 1005 (Conn. 1993). 
163. 2014 AAA LEXIS 71 (2014) (Kaufman, Arb.). 
164. In re Cardinal Local Sch. v. Cardinal Educ. Ass’n, 127 BNA LA 882 (2010) (Lalka, Arb.). 
165. 2011 AAA LEXIS 472 (2011) (Brown, Arb.). 
166. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 65, at 930–31. 
167. See, e.g., In re Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 BNA LA at 558; In re Enterprise Wire Co., 
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is the importance of documentation of events—on both sides—leading up to 
the imposition of discipline and other documentation required to support a just 
cause finding by the arbitrator.  It stands to reason that arbitrators hearing  
discipline cases would expect evidentiary proof in support of, or against,  
discipline.  Thus, both unions and school districts should not underestimate the 
importance of initiating and maintaining records of relevant employment  
activities on a systematic basis.    
IV. Position Elimination/Transfer 
Economic circumstances and demographic considerations may lead to the 
elimination of positions, realignment of positions, or even the merger of 
schools.168  Even in cases in which a coach is able to retain his or her position 
in a realigned organization, a grievance may arise.169  Although school dis-
tricts generally enjoy wide latitude to deploy resources under its management  
function, school districts must act in good faith170 and follow the dictates of 
the applicable CBA.  The inclusion of contract language that requires or guar-
antees coaching positions will help counter a school district’s claim that it has 
the right to eliminate a coaching position.171  In contrast, contract language 
granting a school district sole discretion to assign and transfer members in the 
district for “valid education reasons,” will be supportive of a district’s claim 
that it has a right to move a coach or even eliminate a coaching position.172  
V. Contract Interpretation 
The parties to a CBA should prefer that terms of their labor-management 
relationship not be determined by an arbitrator.  Under established rules of  
contract interpretation, an arbitrator must start his or her analysis by looking to 
the language set forth in the CBA.173  However, if contract language is not  
carefully crafted with clarity, arbitrators will look to the rules of contract  
interpretation to determine the intent of the parties.174  Past practice is one 
                                                                                                                                               
46 BNA LA. at 362–65 (1964); Shrage, supra note 67, at 20. 
168. See, e.g., 2013 BNA LA Supp. 148123 (2013) (Rinaldo, Arb.). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. See, e.g., 2009 AAA LEXIS 863 (2009) (Trela, Arb.). 
172. In re Nw. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Nw. Ass’n of Educators, 128 BNA LA 1690 
(2011) (Heekin, Arb.). 
173. Emp’r v. Sch. Empl., AFSCME Local _, Local #_, 2011 BNA LA Supp. 149464 (2011) 
(Stein, Arb.). 
174. Id. 
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method used by arbitrators to determine the meaning of contract language.175  
Under the definition of “past practice,” the pattern of administering the con-
tract will be part of the analysis used by an arbitrator in determining the mean-
ing of the contract.176  Therefore, it is critical in negotiating a CBA that a party  
intending to change a prior practice clearly draft new language that is clear and 
that requires an arbitrator to rely solely on the new language and not on past 
practice.177  
VI. Arbitrability 
The fact that a coach is often subject to the teacher CBA does not  
automatically mean that an arbitrator has jurisdiction or authority to decide the 
grievance filed by the coach.178  The jurisdiction of an arbitrator to decide the 
merits of a case can be limited by the terms of the CBA.179  An arbitrator’s ju-
risdiction can be limited if one party or the other has missed contractually es-
tablished time limits established by the grievance procedure,180 or due to the 
grievant’s position or the subject matter of the grievance not being subject to 
the grievance procedure.181     
FINAL COMMENT 
Although student participation in high school sports has been growing,182 
many school districts have continued to hire part-time coaches that are subject 
to teacher CBAs. Such positions are often considered “extra-curricular” work 
despite the fact that coaches may be subject to the employment issues de-
scribed in this article.  In light of the employment issues impacting high school 
coaches, teacher unions and school districts would be well advised to review 
their CBAs with an eye towards protecting and advancing their respective in-
terests, and then seek language inclusions and/or exclusions in the next round 
of  
labor-management negotiations to reflect those interests.   
 
                                                            
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. See 2010 BNA LA Supp. 162490 (2010) (Caffera, Arb.). 
178. See NATHAN & GREEN, supra note 131, § 8.01(2). 
179. See id. § 8.01(3). 
180. See 2007 AAA LEXIS 516 (2007) (Nielsen, Arb).  
181. See 2009 AAA LEXIS 1227 (2009) (Wolkinson, Arb.); 2009 AAA LEXIS 1120 (2009)  
(Kaufman, Arb.). 
182. See 2014–2015 High School Athletics Participation Survey, supra note 12. 
